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FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

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U.S. EVOLVING NEW ATTITUDES TOWARD BRITAIN AND RUSSIA

MORE than any action the United States might have taken in international affairs, the Presidential elections, held in an atmosphere of order and national unity, have given hope to nations torn by war and threatened by civil strife that human beings, under favorable circumstances, can work out common problems by peaceful means. At a time when peoples liberated from German rule are in the throes of internal readjustment, they find reason to renew the touching faith so many non-Americans have in our democracy—a faith expressed by an American song-writer in words made popular by the Negro balladist Josh White:

"What is America to me?...
A land that we call freedom
The home of liberty
With its promise for tomorrow,
That's America to me."

Not only has the actual holding of elections in the midst of a grueling war strengthened the confidence of those abroad who are seeking a middle course between various forms of totalitarianism. The resounding defeat of notable isolationists throughout the nation has also aroused hope that the United States will not turn its back on the rest of the world, as in 1919, and will do its share as a partner in the common enterprise of post-war reconstruction. It would be dangerous, however, for us who are living here in relative peace to relax now, on the assumption that isolationism is dead and that international organization is just around the corner. We have cleared the first hurdle—but many others remain. To support international collaboration in words is one thing. To practice it by day-to-day deeds is another, and far more arduous, undertaking.

FEAR OF RUSSIA. The actual mechanics of United States participation in the organization tentatively mapped out at Dumbarton Oaks—notably the way in which the American delegate on the Security

Council is to vote—will occupy the attention of Congress and the public in the months ahead. But even more important than these questions of procedure will be our attitude toward the countries with whom we plan to collaborate in the establishment of a United Nations organization.

American opinion on world affairs is sometimes distractingly mercurial. Exaggerated idealization of Russia and China tends to yield, at the first doubt or disappointment, to equally exaggerated apprehension. This tendency to jump from one extreme to the other is particularly conspicuous today in a new wave of suspicion concerning Russia. Now that the hostility formerly aroused by Soviet practices with respect to private property and religion has declined, fear is being increasingly expressed that a victorious Russia may seek to dominate Europe. That Russia will have a profound interest in the future development of the continent is beyond question. Russia is a European power, and we cannot exclude it from Europe even if we wanted to do so. But there is nothing to stop the United States and Britain from taking a similarly active interest—nothing except the return of that indifferentism which characterized the attitude of the Anglo-Saxon powers toward the continent during the inter-war years.

The countries of Western Europe are only too eager to collaborate with Britain and the United States in the reconstruction of their economies and the establishment of a strong and lasting system of security against renewed aggression by Germany. And of all these countries France, which has emerged from its ordeal with renewed faith in itself and a strong desire for reform, can be most helpful in acquainting the Americans and British—whose practical knowledge of the sufferings and needs of Europeans is still pitifully small—with the plans and aspirations of the liberated peoples. It is an encouraging sign that, on Armistice Day the United States,

Britain and Russia announced France had been officially invited to participate in the work of the European Advisory Commission which is formulating Allied policy toward Germany. In the past France has exercised a peculiar sway over the minds of Europeans not only west, but also east, of Berlin. A revived and strengthened France could now play a decisive role in stabilizing the continent.

Paradoxical as it may seem, fear that Russia will seek to dominate Europe is usually coupled with fear that it may not shoulder a sufficiently large share of the burden of war in the Pacific. Russia is just as vitally concerned with Asia as it is with Europe. It is in the interest of Russia that Japan, which ever since the Sino-Japanese war of 1895 has been a growing threat to the Siberian mainland, should be defeated and weakened. Stalin's reference to Japan as one of the world's aggressors on November 6, the eve of the twenty-seventh anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, does not mark a departure from accepted Russian policy. What it does indicate is that Russia is closer than at any time since its invasion by Germany to the moment when, with the conclusion of war in Europe, it can turn its attention to war in Asia.

SWING TOWARD BRITAIN. Fear of Russia, which has recently been linked to fear of Communism in this country, and doubts about China's internal strength, have resulted in an increasingly warm feeling here toward Britain, both among the general public and among those government officials who, in the past, had seemed more concerned with a "hard" peace for Britain than for Germany. The impression is gaining ground that the British Isles are essential

for the security of the United States in the Atlantic, and that it is therefore in our interest to further the economic revival of Britain after the war. By a strange twist of fate, some of the liberated countries -notably France-which suffered far less physical destruction than Britain, are now in a position to prepare for reconversion to peacetime activities in relative quiet, while the British must not only maintain their wartime restrictions, but also face the prospect of more active participation in the Pacific war once war in Europe is over. Many Americans who have recently visited England strongly believe that, instead of blocking Britain's post-war recovery by excessive demands for a disproportionate share of civil aviation, merchant shipping, and trade, especially in areas like the Middle East where we had been relatively inactive before the war, we should do everything in our power to get Britain back on its feet. The extent to which we are prepared to go in practice to achieve this objective will be revealed by the Chicago air conference and the negotiations now under way in Washington concerning possible revision of lend-lease arrangements in such a way as . to permit Britain to prepare for the resumption of export trade.

The closer we come to the establishment of an international organization, the more we begin to see that the Dumbarton Oaks proposals are necessarily only a skeleton that remains to be clothed with flesh. To do this we and the other United Nations must learn to work effectively together, free both of nostalgia for isolation and of aspirations to imperialism.

Vera Micheles Dean

BRITISH AND U.S. AIR POLICIES SHAPED BY POSTWAR TRADE GOALS

The Chicago Civil Aviation Conference, which opened on November 1, draws to its close with agreement foreshadowed on most of the technical problems under discussion, but with slight hope that any of the more ambitious plans for the creation of an International Air Authority will be realized at the present time. The last-minute withdrawal of the Soviet delegation from participation in the conference highlighted the opening of the parley. No fully adequate explanation is yet available of Russia's refusal to allow its delegation, already en route to Chicago, to join in the talks. Most observers believe that the sudden decision may reflect Russia's present lack of interest in international aviation—dictated by the fact that most of the projected air routes after the war will not pass over Soviet territory.

AN INTERIM AIR COUNCIL. Profound differences have developed during the conference between British and American points of view. But all the conferees apparently have proceeded on the assumption that there will be no interference with trade and intercourse between nations, although sovereignty of the air space above any given territory will be main-

tained. There is now assurance that an interim council will be established which will have consultative powers to deal with civil aviation during the transition from war to peace. This council will serve only in an advisory capacity on such technical questions as the rules of air navigation, safety regulations, weather reports and landing signals. The broader, more crucial questions relating to quotas, rates, and the allocation of routes will be deferred to bilateral negotiations where necessary, or until some later date when it may be possible again to consider the international air transport problem. It is the solution of these questions which will ultimately determine whether an international body; possessed of sufficient authority to regulate as well as advise on all matters relating to aviation, can be erected.

There was some hope for a time that a compromise proposal of the Canadian delegation might be accepted—a compromise which would have resulted in a stronger council and which would have granted more favorable terms to American companies by the institution of sliding scales for schedules and traffic. Under the Canadian plan, if United States carriers

proved more efficient, they would be granted increased traffic. In accordance with United States desires, however, the "consultative" interim council—which will probably follow the organizational form suggested by Col. Pedro A. Chapa, head of the Mexican delegation and leader of the Latin American bloc at the conference—will have no power to limit competition or institute any quota schemes. In addition to this Latin American support, the general United States plan also has been favored by the Chinese delegation.

U.S. AND BRITAIN AT ODDS. Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle, Jr., chairman of the American delegation, stated the United States position bluntly at the opening session. Making no reference to the relation between a world agreement on aviation and world security in general, or to the United Nations organization outlined by the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, Mr. Berle indicated that the United States was prepared only for consideration of technical matters. He stated the one point of most common agreement among all delegates—that the sovereignty of every nation over its own air be maintained, with the right of innocent passage and landing for fuel and servicing to be extended to foreign airlines. But with regard to rate-fixing, schedules and routes, he proposed that individual companies be allowed to work these out on a competitive basis.

Great Britain, represented at the conference by Viscount Swinton, Minister of Civil Aviation, had made its position clear in a government White Paper on October 19. The White Paper favored a world system of regulation in opposition to full-fledged competition, a policy described by many as a proposal for a world 'flight cartel.' This proposal, similar to the plan presented by the Canadian delegation, favored the creation of a strong regulatory body whose functions and powers would resemble those of our own domestic Civil Aeronautics Board.

BASIC DECISIONS DEFERRED. The differences between the United States and Britain which have emerged publicly during the present conference may be explained both in terms of air transport and in terms of the broader trade relations of the two nations. The United States occupies a strong position because of its tremendous aviation industry, greatly augmented during the war; its vast domestic transport system; and the great portion of future traffic, both passenger and cargo, which will undoubtedly originate within the United States. Britain, on the other hand, has no need for a large transport industry within its island confines, although a sizable air-

craft industry has been built up there during the war. But the British Commonwealth and Empire can provide bases throughout the world and, so long as the traditional theory of sovereignty over the air space above that territory is maintained, Britain has a formidable bargaining point.

The British-American differences are but part of the very difficult adjustments which must be made in all economic relations between the two countries in the post-war period. Knowing that they will be dependent as never before on an increase in foreign trade and on transport receipts—both in shipping and aviation—the British naturally feel they must press for maximum participation in future air traffic. Britain is prepared to sacrifice competition in various areas of trade and transport in return for assurance that it will garner a share capable of guaranteeing equality of power with the other great nations, and commensurate with the financial needs of internal policies arising from the insistent demand for full employment and complete social security coverage. There is every evidence that Britain is prepared to make the adjustments which such policies entail, even if governmental control of economic life proves necessary or if regulation of competition internally or in the international sphere is demanded.

The United States, on the other hand, flushed by a prodigious industrial expansion resulting from the war, and faced with the necessity of providing postwar employment opportunities, seeks expanding opportunities abroad. In accordance with our traditional anti-monopoly policies at home, and under pressure from the several domestic air carriers now desirous of a share in the expected foreign business, the American delegation naturally fosters maximum competition in post-war flying. It is this broader trade struggle between Britain and the United States, unresolved during the aviation discussions at Chicago, which still awaits clarification at the highest policy level.

GRANT S. McCLELLAN


F.P.A. DIRECTOR ELECTED TO SENATE

The F.P.A. announces with pleasure that Mr. H. Alexander Smith, a member of the National Board of Directors since 1932, has been elected as the Republican Senator from the state of New Jersey. Mr. Smith, a graduate of Princeton and Columbia University Law School, has had wide experience in international affairs. Among other activities, he was a member of Mr. Hoover's staff, U.S. Food Administration in 1918; a member of the Executive Committee and Director of the European Children's Fund; Director of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, Inc.; member of the American Friends of Yugoslavia; and member of the Executive Committee and Director of the Belgian American Educational Foundation.

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Washington News Letter



TERRORIST ACTIVITIES SHARPEN PALESTINE ISSUE

The murder of Walter Edward Guinness, first Baron Moyne, British Resident Minister in the Middle East, on November 6 in Cairo, has focused attention on the terroristic activities of two secret organizations, the Irgun Zvei Leuni and the Stern Gang, which harass Palestine despite efforts made by police under British supervision to preserve order and protect life. Baron Moyne, the highest ranking British political official in the Middle East, had recently been conferring on the problem of Palestine's future. Two members of the Stern Gang confessed the crime, which occurred in front of the Minister's house in Cairo.

ZIONISTS OPPOSE TERRORISM. This terrorist movement is due to two main factors: the dissatisfaction of Zionist Jews with the British government's continuing reluctance to act on the 1917 Balfour Declaration, which promised the creation of a Jewish National Home in the Holy Land; and the dispute among Zionists as to the tactics they should use to prod the British into action. Dr. Chaim Weizmann, president of the Zionist Organization, advocates patience; last summer he said that Britain is "destined to become the guardian of Israel's hope." By contrast, the late Vladimir Jabotinski, founder of the schismatic New Zionist Organization, favored the immediate establishment of a Jewish Commonwealth an both sides of the Jordan River.

In their current platform the New Zionists, who are using demonstrations, newspaper advertisements, mass meetings and press conferences to achieve their objectives, demand the following: British relinquishment of the Palestine mandate; Jewish representation among the United Nations; exchange of populations between Arabs and Jews; and acceptance by the United States of responsibility for fulfillment of the Balfour Declaration's provisions of the mandate. Both the New Zionist Organization and the Zionist Organization, however, oppose the terrorists in Palestine.

These men actually are believed to number not more than a few hundred. They doubt that mere political pressure will ever settle the Palestine question as they would like to see it settled, split off into an extremist group. Putting their faith in armed, terroristic action, they formed an organization known as Irgun. When, in 1941, the Irgun decided to suspend its tactics for the duration of the war, Abraham Stern revolted and organized the Sternists as a con-

tinuing terror society. Stern was killed in a clash with the police in 1942.

Both the Irgun and the Stern Gang are secret societies. Their membership, programs, and sources of weapons and bombs are unknown. The Moyne murder—the ninth this year—was the first venture of the terrorists outside Palestine. These terroristic methods are viewed with disfavor by most advocates of the Jewish National Home in Palestine. For example, Dr. Nahum Goldmann, member of the executive committee of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, said on November 10 that the majority of Palestinians "abhor" Sternist practices.

BASIS OF U.S. INTERVENTION. This terrorism is but a sympton of a problem that concerns the United States as well as Britain—the problem of continuing unrest in Palestine, where British measures have placated neither the Jewish nor the Arab population. The Balfour Declaration disturbed the Arabs and incited them to riot and terrorism; in 1939 the British government issued its White Paper placing severe restrictions on Jewish immigration into Palestine. This, in turn, fomented Jewish terrorism. The vast majority of Palestine Jews, however, have given Britain wholehearted cooperation throughout the war; and 30,000 are serving with British forces in the Middle East.

Since 1939 political opposition to the White Paper policy has developed in the United States, which claims interest through having signed the Palestine Mandate. Both the Democratic and Republican platforms of 1944 called for the transformation of Palestine into a Jewish Commonwealth.

The State Department has not encouraged current movements for United States intervention in Palestine affairs, but it is probable that the Washington administration will request Britain to review the whole question as part of an expected re-examination of League of Nations mandates. On June 23 Mr. Roosevelt told the Palestine Arab party that the future of their country would be determined by the governments responsible for the establishment of a world order of peace and justice, after consultation with Jews and Arabs. The Palestine question may be one of the first that will have to be considered by the United Nations international organization envisaged in the Dumbarton Oaks document.

BLAIR BOLLES:

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